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This article reviews research on the role social and family policies play for 
fertility in Sweden. Swedish family policies are not directly aimed at encouraging 
childbirth. Their main goal has rather been to support women’s participation in 
the labour force and to promote gender equality. They focus on enabling 
individuals to pursue their family and occupational pathways without being too 
dependent on other persons. The following measures have helped women to 
reconcile family and working life: individual taxation and individual-based social-
security systems, which make gendered segregation of work and care less 
attractive for couples; an income replacement-based parental-leave system, which 
gives women incentives to establish themselves on the labour market before 
considering childbirth; and subsidised child care, which allows women to return 
to work after parental leave. Fertility has fluctuated during recent decades but—as 
in the other Nordic countries with similar welfare state setups—it has remained 
well above the European average. The Swedish institutional context clearly is 
conducive to such ‘highest-low’ fertility. My review documents the importance of 
institutional factors in shaping childbearing behaviour and demonstrates some 




In demographic research, Sweden often stands out as a country of reference, 
because it combines the following two features: First of all, it has been a 
forerunner in the development of important aspects of family-demographic 
behaviour, and second, it has some of the best demographic data in the world to 
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detect such developments. The Swedish experience is also of interest because it 
has been innovative in terms of policy development related to family life. In the 
1970s and 1980s, changes in women’s position in society motivated the 
introduction of a wide range of policies with the aim of achieving greater 
compatibility between women’s role in the family and at work. Subsequently, 
public policies have continued to aim at promoting gender equality but then 
focused more explicitly on men and their reconciliation of family and work.  
It is very common to associate the relatively high fertility in Sweden and its 
Nordic neighbours with its policies and the characteristics of the Nordic welfare 
regime. The recuperation of fertility levels in the Nordic countries during the 
1980s is often thought to be linked with the introduction and extension of various 
family-related policies. In the early 1990s, the remarkably high fertility in Sweden 
at that time attracted particular attention. The role of higher compatibility between 
female employment and parenthood in Sweden—and elsewhere in Scandinavia—
has been stressed by a large number of authors, as witnessed by a long sequence 
of pertinent publications during the last two decades: see, for example, Moen 
(1989), Sundström (1991), Haas (1992), Pauti (1992), Sundström and Stafford 
(1992), Bernhardt (1993), B. Hoem (1993), Ellingsæter and Rønsen (1996), 
Rindfuss and Brewster (1996), Hoem and Hoem (1996, 1999), Brewster and 
Rindfuss (2000), Oláh (2003), Rønsen (2004a,b), Hoem (2005) and Neyer et al. 
(2006). In the early 1990s, Bernhardt (1991) called the Swedish experience a 
positive example for other countries in Europe to follow, and according to Pinelli 
(1995) Sweden exemplified the possibility of encouraging fertility increase in a 
country. The importance of institutional changes that help women combine 
production and reproduction has also been stressed by Eurostat, which, in a 
number of population projections, has made future fertility levels in EU countries 
dependent on the implementation of such policies (for an early discussion, see 
Joshi 1996). 
It is important to note that Swedish family policy has never specifically 
targeted childbearing but has rather aimed at strengthening women’s participation 
in the labour market and promoting gender and social equality. The focus has 
been on enabling individuals to pursue their family and occupational tracks 
without being too dependent on other persons or being constrained by institutional 
factors. Policies are explicitly focusing on individuals and not on families as such. 
In terms of childbearing, the goal is to enable women and men to raise the number 
of children they want to have. Surveys on young Swedes reveal that, on average, 
Swedish women and men aspire to have well above two children (Swedish 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 2001; Goldstein et al. 2003). In view of 
these results, Swedish authorities have become particularly concerned about 
childbearing dynamics when period fertility declined far below the population 
replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. This was the case at the end of the 
1970s and, once more, in the mid to late 1990s. In both cases, the low fertility 
induced the Swedish authorities to investigate what could be done to help Gunnar Andersson  91 
Swedish people have the number of children they claim they want to have. (For 
the most recent study, see Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 2001.) 
On both occasions, low fertility was considered a welfare issue, and the purpose 
of the investigations was to detect the obstacles in society that might prevent 
individuals from pursuing their desired life goals. In the Swedish debate, the 
desirability of higher fertility as such was articulated more explicitly during these 
two periods than at other times. In both cases, fertility started to increase again 




2  Recent childbearing trends in Sweden 
The fact that fertility is generally high in Sweden has been obscured by the strong 
fluctuations in childbearing in recent decades. A presentation of aggregate trends 
in childbearing in the four main Nordic countries as they show up in period Total 
Fertility Rates (TFR) reveals that Swedish fertility has exhibited a roller coaster 
pattern (Hoem and Hoem 1996) with undulations around the average of the other 
Nordic countries (see Figure 1). The general picture of Nordic fertility shows an 
increase during the 1980s followed by a convergence between countries towards 
the present Nordic average of a TFR around 1.8 children or more per woman. In 
an international comparison, such a fertility level can be labelled as highest-low: 
it is below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman but still high as 
compared to many other developed countries.  
 
Figure 1: 
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Recent fluctuations in Swedish period total fertility show an upward trend 
from 1983 to 1990, a sharp drop from 1992 to 1997 and a recovery from 1999 to 
the present day: monthly statistics from Statistics Sweden reveal that by the 
beginning of 2008 Swedish fertility was still increasing. As fertility measure, 
however, the TFR is a very crude indicator. It is better suited to describe the 
completed childbearing of cohorts of women and men than the fertility 
developments during a period. In various publications, I have instead presented 
period trends in childbearing at different birth orders of women in Sweden (see 
Andersson 1999 with an update in Andersson 2004a) and other Scandinavian 
countries (Andersson 2002, 2004b) by applying more advanced statistical 
methods to longitudinal population register data. Following an approach first 
suggested and described by Jan Hoem (1991, 1993a), this amounts to a modern 
version of indirect standardisation, which allows for (i) a disaggregated 
description of demographic change, displaying trends in childbearing for 
important subgroups of women, (ii) the efficient use of available data, controlling 
for compositional changes over the demographic categories at hand, and (iii) the 
use of a metric that is appropriate for a period-based analysis, giving information 
about changes over time in the propensity of the different groups of women to 
give birth. In practice, it amounts to applying event history techniques (in the 
form of proportional hazards models) to the childbearing histories of Swedish 
women and presenting relative risks of childbearing for different subgroups of 
women by a variable that represents the effect of calendar period.  
Figures 2 and 3 describe Swedish childbearing dynamics by means of a set of 
standardised annual birth rates of childless women and mothers, respectively. 
Figure 2 shows how first-birth fertility of women at ages below 30 decreased up 
to the mid-1980s. This decline was followed by a marked increase in the first-
birth fertility of older women, together reflecting general postponement of entry 
into motherhood. During the Swedish baby boom of the 1980s, birth propensities 
also increased strongly for mothers at different parities (Figure 3)—as well as for 
younger childless women. By contrast, the 1990s showed strong declines in birth 
risks. As in the 1980s, practically all demographic subgroups of women followed 
these trends. In relative terms, the drops were strongest in first-birth rates of 
younger women and in third and fourth-birth rates. Another clear trend reversal in 
birth propensities occurred after 1997. It is interesting to note that the increase in 
childbearing propensities in 1998 and 1999 is not evident in aggregated TFR data. 
The TFR of Sweden was recorded at 1.50 in these two years, the lowest level ever 
registered. With our presentation, we can get at the dynamics underlying the 
childbearing of different subgroups of women and reveal more accurately when 
important changes in childbearing behaviour occurred.  
A comparison of the childbearing dynamics in Sweden as expressed in 
Figures 2 and 3 with those in other Nordic countries reveals many similarities in 
patterns and trends. It also shows that Swedish fertility has fluctuated more 
strongly than the corresponding birth rates of its neighbours (Andersson 2002, 
2004b; Neyer et al. 2006). Gunnar Andersson  93 
Figure 2: 
Standardised annual first-birth rates. Swedish childless women, 1970-2002, by group 
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Figure 3:  
Standardised annual second-, third-, and fourth-birth rates. Swedish mothers, 1970-

































Source: Andersson (2004a) Policies and practices related to the ‘highest-low’ fertility of Sweden  94 
The recent stability and similarity in the fertility of the other Nordic countries 
suggests that their fertility levels somehow reflect an underlying Nordic fertility 
regime at the beginning of the 21st century. Finally, the image of very volatile 
Swedish fertility withers if we look at the completed childbearing of Swedish 
cohorts of women (Andersson et al. 2008). Statistics of this kind show that each 
female cohort born in 1935 and later has achieved an ultimate number of children 
within the narrow range of around 1.9-2.1 children per woman. (For information 
on patterns in cohort fertility in the Nordic countries, see Andersson et al. 2008; 
Frejka and Calot 2001; Björklund 2006.) The combined information of different 
fertility statistics indicates a long-term relative stability of Swedish fertility, with 
short-term period fluctuations occurring both around its own long-term cohort 
fertility level and around a recent average of Nordic period fertility. When 
comparing cohort fertility measures of the Nordic countries, Sweden is the 
country with the most stable ultimate number of children born. 
 
 
3  Swedish childbearing dynamics  
Both the relatively high fertility of Sweden and its recent fluctuations need to be 
seen in the light of the specific setup of the Swedish welfare regime. Its general 
orientation is to make family activities and the labour force participation of 
women and men compatible. This is evident in both the fairly high fertility and in 
the strong labour market attachment of Swedish women and men. For women, 
reconciling family and working life is facilitated by (i) individual taxation and an 
individual-based social-security system, which makes gendered segregation of 
work and care less attractive for couples, (ii) an income-replacement based 
parental-leave system, which gives women incentives to establish themselves on 
the labour market before considering childbirth, (iii) the flexibility of this system, 
which allows parents to divide the leave between them on a full-time or part-time 
basis at any time until the child turns eight, (iv) subsidised child care, which 
allows mothers to return to work after parental leave, and (v) the right to take paid 
leave from work to care for a sick child. The latter option is shared more equally 
among fathers and mothers than parental leave. The sharing fits reasonably well 
with the Swedish policy focus on gender equality, which aims not only at 
enhancing women’s position on the labour market but also at encouraging men to 
engage more actively in childrearing tasks within the family. 
In general, it is difficult to determine exactly to what extent family policies or 
packages of such policies truly affect childbearing behaviour in a country. In 
empirical research, such policies would be treated as macro-level factors, and it is 
often impossible to isolate the effect of one such factor on individual-level 
behaviour from the possibly competing impact of other macro-level factors. 
Cross-country comparisons of the gendered patterns in labour market activity and 
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Europe nevertheless lend some support to the role of political and institutional 
factors in explaining childbearing behaviour (for empirical examples, see various 
contributions in Andersson and Neyer 2004). We find further support for the 
importance of such factors by a detailed examination of patterns in the 
childbearing of women in Sweden. Andersson (2000) and Hoem (2000) 
demonstrated, for example, that women who are well established on the labour 
market and have a decent level of income are much more inclined to become a 
mother than childless women with a weaker attachment to the labour market. This 
pattern underlines that Swedish women by no means consider parenthood and 
work as competing activities. The pattern is probably strengthened by the design 
of the Swedish parental-leave system with its distinct income replacement 
character, i.e. a leave allowance amounting to 80% of a person’s earnings prior to 
childbirth. This system seems to be conducive to higher fertility levels in that it 
raises the compatibility of childbearing and employment. For a woman in 
Sweden, a decent level of income is nowadays considered a prerequisite for her 
childbearing and certainly not as an obstacle to it. Evidently, this system is also 
sensitive to economic trends. Andersson (2000) and Hoem (2000) demonstrated 
that recent variations in the business cycle have fuelled the roller coasters in 
Swedish fertility. In particular the economic downturn in Sweden in the early 
1990s triggered the subsequent fertility decline during much of that decade. 
Moreover, studies of childbearing patterns in relation to the labour market 
attachment of Swedish parents by Andersson, Duvander and Hank (2005) and 
Andersson and Scott (2007) reveal that the impacts of female and male earnings 
on a couple’s childbearing behaviour are fairly similar. This suggests that there is 
at least some degree of gender equality in the way Swedish couples deal with 
building their families.  
Figure  4 provides further suggestive evidence of the equalising effects 
brought about by the Swedish policy setup as reflected in the childbearing 
dynamics past age 30 of Swedish women at different educational levels. The 
figure reveals that the average number of children born to women at age 30 is 
much lower for those with a post-secondary education than among those with 
shorter educations. This is not surprising as highly educated women have had less 
time to establish themselves on the labour market and are likely to commence 
childbearing later than women who only have primary or secondary education. 
What is more interesting is that the highly educated women manage to recuperate 
their fertility at subsequent ages so that educational differences in ultimate 
fertility (Figure  4) and ultimate childlessness (Andersson et al. 2008) have 
vanished by the time the women reach the end of their reproductive years. 
The importance of institutional factors in shaping childbearing behaviour is 
further highlighted by in-depth studies on the childbearing dynamics of foreign-
born women in Sweden. If cultural factors were most decisive for childbearing 
behaviour, one would expect quite different dynamics for women and men from 
widely different countries of origin. However, the opposite holds true. Swedish Policies and practices related to the ‘highest-low’ fertility of Sweden  96 
and foreign-born women exhibit remarkable similarity in the way they respond to 
recent period effects in Swedish fertility (Andersson 2004c) and in the interaction 
between their attachment to the labour market and their childbearing behaviour 
(Andersson and Scott 2005, 2007). Furthermore, foreign-born women with widely 
different cultural backgrounds exhibit a striking similarity as regards their 
childbearing dynamics in Sweden. We take this as evidence for the relative 
importance of institutional factors in shaping childbearing behaviour. 
 
Figure 4: 
Cohort cumulated fertility at age 30 and above, by educational level at age 30, 













Source: Andersson et al. 2008 
 
 
4  Consequences of family policies: facts or artefacts? 
When studying the possible impact of family policies on childbirth, one ideally 
considers the whole package of measures in their particular context. A specific 
policy cannot be seen in isolation, and in another context its effect might be 
completely different from the one in which it was first introduced. Nevertheless, it 
is worthwhile examining the extent to which specific policies can truly be shown 
to affect individual childbearing behaviour in a certain context. This can be 
achieved if a policy is depicted in such a way that there is some variation between 
individuals regarding its actual implementation. In this manner, I have studied 
how different aspects of the Swedish parental-leave and child care systems have 
been related to the childbearing dynamics of Swedes.  
The parental-leave and child care systems of Sweden are certainly key 
elements of its family policy. The parental-leave system offers slightly more than Gunnar Andersson  97 
one year of paid leave from work after the birth of a child, which can be shared 
between parents and used in a very flexible way. The allowance paid during this 
leave is based on the income earned prior to childbirth in the same manner as 
income replacement is offered to individuals who take sick leave or are 
unemployed. At present, 80% of the previous earnings are replaced up to an 
annual ceiling of around 32,000 Euro (counted as earnings before tax but after 
social-security contributions). In addition, the scheme comprises generous offers 
for staying home to take care of sick children after the end of parental leave. 
The Swedish parental-leave system was established in the 1970s and extended 
in the 1980s, with the other Nordic countries following the same development 
though at a somewhat slower pace. A specific component of the present Swedish 
system, the so called ‘speed premium’, was also introduced in the 1980s and 
contributed to the fertility increase during that decade. It creates incentives for 
women to have their children at relatively short birth intervals (Hoem 1990, 
1993b; Andersson 1999; Andersson, Hoem and Duvander 2006). A cross-country 
comparison of the period effects in childbearing of mothers in Sweden, Denmark 
and Norway by the time since their last previous childbirth (Andersson 2002, 
2004b) offers the rare opportunity to demonstrate a clear causal effect of a policy 
intervention on childbearing behaviour in a developed country (cf. Ní Bhrolcháin 
and Dyson 2007).  
Much of the present debate on the parental-leave system in Sweden focuses 
on the relatively low uptake of the leave by fathers (Haas and Hwang 1999; 
Sundström and Duvander 2002; Bygren and Duvander 2006). Swedish fathers do 
take close to 20 per cent of all parental leave, which is considerably higher than in 
any other country except Iceland (see Gíslason 2007), but Swedish authorities still 
see the slow progress towards a further increase in paternal involvement in the 
parental-leave scheme as an obstacle to gender equality. It is also commonly 
assumed that increased paternal involvement in childrearing is related to higher 
fertility. A study by Duvander and Andersson (2006) suggests that there is indeed 
a generally positive relationship between the father’s uptake of parental leave and 
a Swedish couple’s propensity to have another child. 
In Sweden, public day care for children is regarded an essential component of 
the overall welfare system and its orientation towards a dual-breadwinner model, 
gender equality and the promotion of equal opportunities for children of all social 
backgrounds (Bergqvist and Nyberg 2002). The provision of public child care 
improved substantially during the 1970s to 1990s, when the expansion of such 
services became a generally accepted policy objective. At present, practically all 
children in Sweden have access to subsidised high-quality child care. A study by 
Andersson, Duvander and Hank (2004) examines if the local variation in child 
care characteristics can be related to the childbearing dynamics of parents in 
different Swedish municipalities. They find no such indication and interpret the 
absence of effects as a reflection of the generally very appropriate level of child 
care in Sweden. They conclude that “despite some regional variation in the Policies and practices related to the ‘highest-low’ fertility of Sweden  98 
quantity, quality and price of day care, the overall coverage with affordable, high-
quality child care opportunities is apparently on a sufficiently high level as to 
allow parents to make their fertility decisions relatively independent of the 
specific characteristics of their local area”. For a related study on Norway that 




5  Family policies and fertility: an assessment of different 
policy options 
In this review, I have demonstrated how childbearing patterns in Sweden are 
related to the setup of the Swedish welfare state. Policies aimed at strengthening 
women’s labour market attachment and promoting gender equality have made it 
easier for women to combine work and family life. In such a setting, fertility has 
remained relatively high.  
The policies that have been most important in creating such a setting are the 
specific combination of individual taxation, a flexible parental-leave scheme 
based on income replacement and a system of high-quality full-time day care. 
Together they support the present dual bread-winner model of Sweden. I have not 
paid attention to the existing scheme of child allowances since the levels of such 
allowances do not largely deviate from those in other developed countries. While 
being helpful in alleviating some of the direct costs of having children, it is 
debatable whether they are likely to promote childbirth as such. In the Swedish 
context, childbirth is supported by providing an infrastructure that allows women 
and men to pursue their individual life goals in terms of family and professional 
life. In economic terms, Swedish families base their affluence on own earnings 
rather than on allowances. 
An important aspect of Swedish policies is that they target individuals and not 
families as such. They have no intention of supporting certain family forms, such 
as marriage, over others. An analysis of crude birth rates and various other crude 
indicators of the family dynamics of European countries suggests that this might 
be a wise strategy if one is interested in higher fertility. There is a very clear 
pattern that countries with more traditional family behaviour, such as a high 
propensity for marriage, low divorce rates and low levels of out-of-wedlock 
childbearing, have the lowest fertility while countries with greater diversity in 
their family dynamics have the highest fertility (Billari and Kohler 2004). 
Evidently, in a context that confines childbearing to a restricted set of 
conservative family forms, there will always be a fraction of the population that 
tries to avoid getting trapped in such a life situation. A persistent focus on gender 
equality in public as well as in private life (McDonald 2000a, 2000b) seems to be 
a better strategy for policy makers who want to create an environment where 
women do not see childbearing as a step towards reducing their personal freedom. Gunnar Andersson  99 
A final suggestion based on our study is that the fertility levels of the Nordic 
countries at the beginning of the 21st century are useful as a benchmark when 
making forecasts about the fertility that is likely to appear when a society tries to 
reconcile the active labour force participation of women and men with their 
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